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Kantian Autonomy and Political Liberalism 
 
Since the mid 1980s, John Rawls, Charles Larmore, and others have ar-
gued for a political as opposed to a comprehensive conception of liberal-
ism. At the center of political liberalism stands the assertion that liberals 
must withdraw from the commitment to autonomy that one finds in clas-
sical liberalism. The claim is that this is necessary for making liberalism 
suitable for societies characterized by the fact of reasonable pluralism 
and to avoid “liberalism becom[ing] but another sectarian doctrine.”1 A 
society characterized by reasonable pluralism is one in which the citizens 
hold irreconcilable but reasonable views about metaphysics, the meaning 
of life, the source of morality, and the like. Political liberals believe that 
autonomy is something about which there is reasonable disagreement, 
and that liberalism can dispense with the commitment to autonomy with-
out sacrificing “the essential convictions of liberal thought,”2 principally 
the principle of equal respect. The allegiance to equal respect is a core 
component of what is required for making pluralism reasonable. In this 
article I question the idea that a commitment to autonomy necessarily 
leads to sectarianism as well as the notion that one can draw a wedge 
between respect for persons and autonomy. 
 The attack on autonomy is often a unified attack on its place in clas-
sical liberalism; Rawls usually refers to Immanuel Kant’s and John 
Stuart Mill’s comprehensive and autonomy-based liberalisms, and Lar-
more includes John Locke’s.3 This lumping together of very diverse con-
ceptions of autonomy is unhelpful.4 I shall focus on and defend the Kan-
                                                 
 1John Rawls, “Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical,” Philosophy & Public 
Affairs 14 (1985): 223-52, p. 246. 
 2Charles Larmore, The Autonomy of Morality (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2008), p. 146. 
 3Rawls, “Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical,” pp. 245-46; John Rawls, 
Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 37, 78, 145; 
Larmore, The Autonomy of Morality, p. 144. 
 4I show the importance of distinguishing the Millian and the Kantian conceptions of 
autonomy in Christian F. Rostbøll, “Autonomy, Respect, and Arrogance in the Danish 
Cartoon Controversy,” Political Theory 37 (2009): 623-48, and “From the Standpoint of 
Practical Reason: A Reply to Tønder,” Political Theory 39 (2011): 386-93. 
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tian conception of autonomy as indispensable for a liberalism based on 
equal respect. In doing so, my approach differs from most contemporary 
liberals who are committed to autonomy, including critics of political 
liberalism like Will Kymlicka who believe that liberalism requires au-
tonomy, since these liberal autonomists do not rely on a Kantian concep-
tion of autonomy, as I shall specify it.5 
 We should consider two different issues in assessing the Kantian con-
ception of autonomy and its acceptability in a society characterized by 
reasonable pluralism. The first concerns its comprehensiveness, the 
second its metaphysical status. According to Rawls, a conception “is 
comprehensive when it includes conceptions of what is of value in hu-
man life, as well as ideals of personal virtue and character, that are to 
inform much of our nonpolitical conduct.”6 The problem with a compre-
hensive conception of autonomy is that it is unacceptable for people in 
whose conception of the good autonomy does not figure,7 and hence it 
hinders agreement or overlapping consensus. While autonomy as a good 
and character ideal is obvious in Mill, Rawls also maintains that “Kant’s 
doctrine is a comprehensive moral view in which the ideal of autonomy 
has a regulative role for all of life.”8 
 The second issue is more specific to Kant’s theory and concerns the 
notion that Kantian autonomy commits one to a specific and controver-
sial metaphysical theory. According to Larmore, Kantian autonomy im-
plies an identification of self-legislation with self-origination and con-
struction of binding principles. Thus, Larmore gives a very strong and 
metaphysical reading to Kant and contemporary Kantian constructivism, 
which makes it unacceptable from the perspective of other ideas regard-
ing the source of normativity and the constitution of the order of values, 
including Larmore’s own Platonist view. I shall argue that this strong, 
metaphysical reading of Kantian autonomy leads to a premature rejection 
of it and overlooks important insights inherent in the Kantian approach to 
autonomy. 
                                                 
 5Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 
pp. 75 ff., 158 ff.; and Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction, 2nd ed. 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 229 ff. Joseph Raz has developed the 
best known autonomy-based account of liberalism, and distinguishes his use of personal 
autonomy from Kantian moral autonomy; see The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Claren-
don Press, 1986), p. 370 n. 2. See also Gerald F. Gaus, “The Place of Autonomy within 
Liberalism,” in John Christman and Joel Anderson (eds.), Autonomy and the Challenges 
to Liberalism: New Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 272-306, 
at p. 273, who notes that liberal autonomists are committed to personal autonomy rather 
than Kantian autonomy. 
 6Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 175. 
 7Larmore, The Autonomy of Morality, pp. 164-65. 
 8Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 99. 
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 The approach to autonomy one finds in Kant’s moral theory, as be-
longing to the standpoint of practical reason, actually supplies the reason 
why we should treat each other with equal respect and why it is wrong 
for liberalism to be sectarian. Taking autonomy as a practical principle is 
a condition of possibility for a regime of mutual respect. Thus, in the 
Kantian approach to autonomy we find insights that are absent from oth-
er approaches to autonomy. The notion of regarding autonomy as a prac-
tical principle regulating how we treat each other rather than as an ideal 
content of the good life builds on Kantian concepts. When we understand 
this aspect of Kantian autonomy properly, it provides theoretical re-
sources for avoiding the sectarianism and perfectionism of personal au-
tonomy accounts.  
 Note that the issue at stake in this article is neither whether Kant him-
self was a comprehensive liberal, nor whether he was committed to an 
ideal that contemporary liberals would call “personal autonomy” and that 
political liberals would find unsuitable for a culturally diverse society.9 
The issue is rather whether Kantian autonomy, as I shall specify it, draw-
ing on Kant’s and contemporary Kantian writings, is in conflict with 
respect for difference or, as I shall argue, presupposed by such respect. 
The burden of my argument is to defend the notion of regarding autono-
my from the standpoint of practical reason, as we have learned from 
Kant, and not to defend Kant’s entire moral philosophy and much less 
his philosophy as a whole. In other words, my aim is to show that in the 
Kantian approach to autonomy we can find legitimate insights into the 
moral foundations of liberalism, and that these insights are indispensable 
for the specification and justification of the principle of equal respect for 
persons.10 
 In section 1 I draw some distinctions that supply a preliminary indica-
tion of the notion that a commitment to autonomy need not entail a secta-
rian conception of the good but can be seen as having merely instrumen-
                                                 
 9For a discussion of whether Kant’s political or legal philosophy is comprehensive, 
see Thomas Pogge, “Is Kant’s Rechtslehre Comprehensive?” Southern Journal of Phi-
losophy 36, Suppl. (1997): 161-87. For discussions of Kant on personal autonomy, see 
Robert S. Taylor, “Kantian Personal Autonomy,” Political Theory 33 (2005): 602-28, and 
Jeremy Waldron, “Moral Autonomy and Personal Autonomy,” in Christman and Ander-
son (eds.), Autonomy and the Challenges to Liberalism, pp. 307-29. 
 10It should be noted also that I defend Kantian autonomy from the charges made 
against it from within neutralist and antiperfectionist liberalism. Given this, the article 
operates within a narrow range of philosophical perspectives and excludes consideration 
of many others. Of course, to undertake a full defense of Kantian autonomy would re-
quire a discussion of other philosophical positions. One cannot discuss everything at 
once, however, and the aim of this article is limited to arguing that liberalism committed 
to reasonableness and respect should not and cannot jettison the Kantian conception of 
autonomy. 
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tal value and/or as a principle regulating how persons should relate to 
each other. Section 2 supplies an interpretation of Kant that shows that 
the capacity for autonomy that Kant asks us to respect is less controver-
sial than the metaphysical idea of autonomy as self-origination of bind-
ing principles. Section 3 continues the argument that Kantian autonomy 
is not a metaphysical concept by offering an account of what it means to 
approach autonomy from the standpoint of practical reason. I argue that 
this practical approach to autonomy involves seeing autonomy as a prin-
ciple for regulating interpersonal relations rather than as a good to be 
promoted. The attack on Kantian autonomy by political liberals is also 
directed at the idea of “constitutive autonomy,” that is, the idea that val-
ues are made rather than discovered. In section 4 I argue that we can and 
should understand constructivism practically rather than metaphysically. 
Practical constructivism is agnostic towards the metaphysical question 
regarding the ultimate source of reasons and values, and focuses on justi-
fication procedures and the standing of citizens. In the last section before 
the conclusion I argue that while we should dispense with the metaphysi-
cal notion of constitutive autonomy, in politics we should hold on to the 
idea of regarding each as a participant in self-legislation rather than 
merely self-governing. Because political liberals reject Kantian autono-
my, they reduce citizens to self-governing subjects of law and fail to 
explain why we should respect everyone as subject to no other laws than 
those they have given themselves as authors. An important advantage of 
the Kantian approach to autonomy is that it can show an internal connec-
tion between the democratic practice of self-legislation and the norm of 
equal respect without prioritizing one over the other. 
 
 
1. Three Distinctions Regarding Autonomy 
 
Political liberals think liberalism should not include and much less give 
fundamental importance to comprehensive conceptions “of what is of 
value in human life” or to “ideals of personal virtue or character.”11 The 
withdrawal from autonomy is partly based on the claim that it implies a 
sectarian conception of the good. Thus, Larmore maintains that a com-
prehensive conception of autonomy is involved in the “full-scale indivi-
dualism [of classical liberalism], urging a critical detachment toward 
inherited forms of belief and cultural traditions.”12 Locke, Kant, and Mill 
wrongly based neutrality towards conceptions of the good on the idea 
that political principles should respect “the fallibilist, autonomous, or 
experimental attitude that we as persons should maintain at the deepest 
                                                 
 11Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 175. 
 12Larmore, The Autonomy of Morality, p. 144. 
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level of our self-understanding.”13 Conversely, Larmore believes that the 
principle of respect for persons “can figure in those conceptions … that 
refuse to accord supreme value to critical reflection and call instead upon 
forms of moral allegiance that are rooted in a sentiment of belonging.”14 
 Before turning to the Kantian conception of autonomy in the follow-
ing section, I draw three distinctions regarding the use and meaning of 
autonomy, all of which are important for the relationship between auton-
omy and respect. The reason for drawing the first two distinctions is the 
ambiguity of the idea of according “supreme value to critical reflection.” 
 First, to regard something as a necessary condition of something else 
is not identical to regarding the former as having value in itself. One can 
regard critical reflection as a necessary condition of morality and/or of 
acting morally without seeing it as good in itself. The “should” that Lar-
more attributes to Locke, Kant, and Mill is similarly ambiguous. It could 
mean that one should lead an autonomous life because it is the best form 
of life, but it could also mean that the autonomous life is instrumentally 
necessary to living morally correctly and respecting others as equals. I 
would hold that both Kantians and political liberals cannot avoid grant-
ing critical reflection at least instrumental value.15 Larmore, for example, 
admits that entering the moral point of view requires the capacity “to 
stand back from our own person and to see ourselves as but one among 
many.”16 One could then equally ask him whether everyone must value 
this “power of self-detachment,” or if it is merely a necessary condition 
of morality and equal respect.17 Thus, the first distinction is between 
awarding autonomy instrumental value and seeing it as good in itself. It 
would seem as though the latter is in collision with respect for diverse 
conceptions of the good, while the former might rather be a precondition 
of equal respect. 
 Second, it should make a difference to liberals committed to equal 
respect whether what some people refuse (and reasonably can refuse) is 
to treat others as if they have chosen (or were able to choose and revise) 
their conception of the good self-reflectively, or whether they refuse to 
see a life of critical self-reflection as the most valuable form of life for 
themselves. The necessary distinction runs between autonomy as a prin-
                                                 
 13Ibid. (emphasis added). 
 14Ibid., pp. 164-65. 
 15Christian F. Rostbøll, “Freedom of Expression, Deliberation, Autonomy, and Re-
spect,” European Journal of Political Theory 10 (2011): 5-21. 
 16Larmore, The Autonomy of Morality, p. 136. 
 17Gerald Gaus has argued that an “ultra-minimal” degree of personal autonomy is 
required for people to be morally autonomous. People must be capable of self-reflection 
and role-taking in order to understand that other people do not share their conception of 
the good and in order to respect them equally. See Gaus, “The Place of Autonomy within 
Liberalism,” pp. 297-99. 
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ciple guiding how we should relate to one another and autonomy as 
something that ought to be promoted or maximized as a good. In both 
cases, autonomy is seen as foundational, but there is a (normatively sig-
nificant) difference between seeing autonomy as the basis of a norm re-
gulating social relations among people as opposed to seeing autonomy as 
referring to the content of the lives these people should live.18 Only the 
latter understanding of autonomy relies on a conception of the good 
about which there is reasonable disagreement and is in conflict with 
equal respect. The former does not rely on a comprehensive conception 
of the good but rather on a norm about how we ought to treat others—I 
would argue a norm that is presupposed by the principle of respect for 
persons, which one finds also in political liberalism.19 
 Finally, we should distinguish between personal and moral autonomy. 
Personal autonomy regards one’s own good, how one chooses or en-
dorses one’s life plan, goals, and aims, whereas moral autonomy con-
cerns “the relation between one person’s pursuit of his own ends and 
others’ pursuit of theirs.”20 Moral autonomy is not about what is good for 
me but about what can be universalized.21 Thus, while personal autono-
my is about the individual good—about whether it has been reflectively 
endorsed—moral autonomy is about the relationship between different 
people’s different goods or ends and how it has been determined and 
justified. Moral autonomy includes the capacity to set aside one’s pursuit 
of one’s own good when moral reasons demand doing so.22 When we 
distinguish between moral and personal autonomy in this manner, it does 
not necessarily fall along the same lines as the distinction between res-
pecting and promoting autonomy suggested in the previous paragraph. 
                                                 
 18For this way of distinguishing between theories prioritizing the right and theories 
that hold that the state should promote the good, see John Christman, Social and Political 
Philosophy: A Contemporary Introduction (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 97. Cf. Chris-
tine M. Korsgaard, “The Reasons We Can Share,” in Creating the Kingdom of Ends 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 275-310, at p. 275: “The subject 
matter of morality is not what we should bring about, but how we should relate to one 
another.” 
 19One anonymous referee of this article holds that Kant is committed to an idea of the 
good, namely, the kingdom of ends. My suggestion is that the kingdom of ends doesn’t 
say anything about the content of the lives people should live, as long as the equal auton-
omy of everyone is respected, but rather is an ideal specifying how we should relate to 
one another. If there is a “good” involved here, it is the good of equal respect and thus 
should not be rejected by liberals committed to that principle. 
 20Waldron, “Moral Autonomy and Personal Autonomy,” p. 307. 
 21This understanding of moral autonomy is, of course, Kantian, but I want to intro-
duce the distinction between personal and moral autonomy independently of the Kantian 
framework, because I argue that “Kantian autonomy” differs from what I refer to as 
“moral autonomy” in this paragraph.  
 22Gaus, “The Place of Autonomy within Liberalism,” p. 283. 
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Both moral and personal autonomy can be either respected in our rela-
tions with others or promoted as a form of excellence. 
 
 
2. Kantian Autonomy and Respect for Persons 
 
The principle of equal respect is at the core of the political liberalism of 
both Rawls and Larmore. But while for Rawls it belongs to a “freestand-
ing” political conception and is “viewed as latent in the public political 
culture of a democratic society,”23 Larmore sees it as the moral basis of 
political liberalism.24 I shall focus on Larmore’s argument, because I 
agree that liberalism needs a stronger justification than the contingencies 
of a particular culture, and because he has advanced a more detailed crit-
icism of awarding Kantian autonomy a core place not only in liberalism 
but in morality as a whole, than has Rawls. In this way, Larmore repre-
sents the clearest example of the attempt to hold on to a fundamental 
commitment to respect while simultaneously rejecting Kantian autonomy. 
 In The Autonomy of Morality, Larmore writes that he has “set out to 
… attack the foundational role that Kant and the Kantian tradition have 
awarded [autonomy] in their accounts of reason and morality.”25 In light 
of Larmore’s commitment to political liberalism, it would seem that to 
understand and evaluate his objection to the use of autonomy in political 
theory, one could leave aside his metaphysical discussion of the place of 
autonomy in morality. His discussion of autonomy in the political con-
text, however, is not freestanding from his discussion of autonomy in 
moral philosophy. First, his understanding of autonomy in the political 
context—the conception of autonomy he rejects—is partly shaped by his 
understanding of moral autonomy, viz., Kantian autonomy. Second, 
Larmore rejects the notion that political liberalism is freestanding from 
any moral commitment. Even though political liberalism should be inde-
pendent from “any general philosophy of man,” it still needs a moral 
basis.26 This moral basis is the principle of respect for persons. 
 In the discussion of Kantian autonomy in morality, which has relev-
ance also for political theory, Larmore’s target is the Kantian notion that 
moral principles gain their authority from being self-legislated and self-
imposed. Larmore offers a very strong reading of Kantian autonomy, as 
not only a matter of acting on the basis of reasons as opposed to causes, 
but also as meaning that moral principles have their origin in and are 
                                                 
 23Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 13. 
 24Larmore argues against Rawls that political liberalism cannot be freestanding but 
requires a moral basis. See Larmore, “Respect for Persons,” The Hedgehog Review 7 
(Summer 2005): 66-76, pp. 70-71; and The Autonomy of Morality, chap. 6. 
 25Larmore, The Autonomy of Morality, p. 43. 
 26Ibid., p. 139. 
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created by ourselves independently of any prior moral order.27 Thus, 
what he objects to is what we may call autonomy as the self-origination 
of binding principles. 
 Liberalism can do without autonomy, according to Larmore, because 
its more fundamental commitment is to the principle of respect for per-
sons. Despite his attack on Kantian autonomy, Larmore acknowledges 
that his principle of respect for persons “owes a lot to Kant’s view about 
respect and treating persons as ends.”28 As in Kantian ethics, treating 
others with respect involves directly engaging their distinctive capacities 
as persons, that is, “as beings capable of thinking and acting on the basis 
of reasons.”29 Moreover, “to respect others as persons in their own right 
when coercion is at stake is to require that political principles be as justi-
fiable to them as they presumably are to us.”30 
 What I would like to explore is whether (or to what extent and how) 
we can see respect for persons as separable from a commitment to auton-
omy, specifically the Kantian conception of autonomy. We must consid-
er how the Kantian conception of autonomy relates to the distinctions 
drawn in the previous section, as well as what the relationship between 
respect and autonomy is in Kant and neo-Kantianism. Particularly, we 
must consider in some depth which conception of autonomy is presup-
posed in the Kantian notion of treating oneself and others as ends and 
never merely as means. Is it the idea of autonomy as self-origination of 
binding principles that is too controversial for political liberalism? Or is 
it something different? In the reminder of this article I argue that it is 
something different and more suitable to a society characterized by rea-
sonable pluralism. More precisely, I offer an interpretation of Kant that 
highlights some important insights about autonomy, respect, and the 
standpoint of practical reason that are lost in political liberalism because 
of its withdrawal from Kantian autonomy. 
 One might think that the object of Kantian respect is only moral au-
tonomy and not personal autonomy. This is because, in Kant, only the 
capacity of rational beings to give and subject themselves to the moral 
law is truly autonomous in the sense of being a self-originating lawful-
                                                 
 27Ibid., pp. 43-44, 81-82. This reading of Kantian autonomy might fit Korsgaard and 
other Kantian constructivists, but it ignores the realist reading of Kant. See Robert Stern, 
“The Autonomy of Morality and the Morality of Autonomy,” Journal of Moral Philoso-
phy 6 (2009): 395-415, pp. 403-7. Larmore’s interpretation is also at odds with Allen 
Wood’s understanding of Kantian ethics in general and Kantian autonomy in particular. 
See Allen W. Wood, Kantian Ethics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 
esp. pp. 90 ff., 107-19, 295-96 n. 11. 
 28Larmore, The Autonomy of Morality, p. 149. 
 29Ibid., p. 148. 
 30Ibid., p. 149; see also Larmore, “Respect for Persons,” pp. 73-74. 
 Kantian Autonomy and Political Liberalism 349 
 
 
ness free from any influences beyond one’s own will.31 And the dignity 
of human nature lies in the ability to give oneself universal laws and 
being “free with respect to all laws of nature.”32 Pursuing happiness or 
devising one’s own conception of the good is never autonomous in this 
sense; it is always affected by contingent circumstances, by one’s partic-
ular empirical situation, and one’s instincts and impulses. 
 Kant, however, explicitly says that it is “humanity, whether in your 
own person or in the person of another” that should be used “always at 
the same time as an end, never merely as a means.”33 In Religion Within 
the Boundaries of Mere Reason, Kant distinguishes between the predis-
positions to humanity and to personality, where the former concerns 
“self-love” or setting ends for oneself, and the latter is the capacity to act 
out of respect for the moral law.34 Allen Wood argues that it is humani-
ty—which “contains our rational capacity to set ends and devise means 
to them, and our rational self-love, giving us grounds for forming a con-
ception of our happiness and pursuing it”—alone that is the object of 
respect and not our moral predisposition.35 And Christine Korsgaard 
argues that “it is the capacity for the rational determination of ends in 
general, not just the capacity for adopting morally obligatory ends, that 
the Formula of Humanity orders us to cherish unconditionally.”36 This is 
also clear in the definition of the kingdom of ends as “a whole both of 
rational beings as ends in themselves and of the ends of his own that each 
may set himself.”37  
 In addition to Wood’s and Korsgaard’s arguments in favor of includ-
ing the capacity for nonmoral end-setting as an object of respect, it might 
be noted that if respect were only for moral autonomy, there would be no 
respect for our capacity to pursue our own happiness. But if respect is not 
to be an empty principle, it must include respect for the ability to set ends 
of our own, ends that are not shared by others. This becomes clear in 
Kant’s political philosophy or Rechtslehre: “No one can coerce me to be 
happy in his way (as he thinks of the welfare of other human beings); 
                                                 
 31Cf. Taylor, “Kantian Personal Autonomy,” pp. 609-11. 
 32Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, ed. Mary Gregor 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 43 (Ak. 4: 435) (references to Kant’s 
Gesammelte Schriften or the Akademie-Ausgabe of Kant’s works (Ak.), are indicated by 
volume and page number). 
 33Kant, Groundwork, p. 38 (Ak. 4: 429) (emphasis added). 
 34Immanuel Kant, “Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason,” in Religion and 
Rational Theology, ed. and trans. Allen Wood and George Di Giovanni (New York: 
Cambridge Press University, 1996), pp. 74-76 (Ak.: 6: 26-28). 
 35Wood, Kantian Ethics, p. 88. 
 36Christine Korsgaard, “Kant’s Formula of Humanity,” Kant-Studien 77, no. 2 
(1986): 183-202, p. 187. 
 37Kant, Groundwork, p. 41 (Ak. 4: 433). 
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instead, each may seek his happiness in the way that seems good to him, 
provided he does not infringe upon that freedom of others to strive for a 
like end which can coexist with the freedom of everyone in accordance 
with a possible universal law.”38 
 In the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant writes:  
 
Our own will insofar as it would act only under the condition of a possible giving of 
universal law through its maxims … is the proper object of respect; and the dignity of 
humanity consists just in this capacity to give universal law, through the condition of also 
being itself subject to this very lawgiving.39  
 
Thus, it cannot just be humanity as something separable from our moral 
predisposition in and by itself that is the object of respect, as Wood 
claims, but rather our pursuit of happiness under the moral law that is so; 
or more precisely, we respect others as beings who set ends for them-
selves under the condition that they also have the capacity to be moved 
by moral reasons. The object of respect is the combination of humanity, 
the capacity to set nonmoral ends for oneself, and personality, the capaci-
ty for moral self-legislation. On the one hand, respect would lose its ref-
erence to individual human beings if it did not include the capacity to set 
particular ends; on the other hand, we respect others because we regard 
them as having the capacity to set aside their particular ends when they 
are in conflict with moral reasons.40 When we respect others as end-
setters, we thus respect the ability to set ends that are compatible with the 
ability and right of others to do the same. In short, the “dignity of human-
ity” lies in the ability to pursue happiness under the moral law.41 
                                                 
 38Immanuel Kant, “On the Common Saying: That May Be Correct in Theory, But It 
Is of No Use in Practice,” in Practical Philosophy, ed. and trans. Mary Gregor (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 291 (Ak. 8: 290). Allen D. Rosen suggests a 
connection between this principle of civil freedom and the formula of humanity, in 
Kant’s Theory of Justice (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 62 ff. The relation-
ship between Kant’s ethics and his political philosophy, or his Rechtslehre, is, however, 
disputed. Arthur Ripstein, for example, argues that the idea of equal freedom in the phi-
losophy of right is derived from an idea of independence rather than autonomy; see “Kant 
on Law and Justice,” in Thomas E. Hill, Jr. (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Kant’s Ethics 
(Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), pp. 161-78. My concern, however, is the use of 
autonomy and respect in Kant’s moral philosophy because of its pre-eminence in much 
contemporary Kantian political philosophy (particularly because of the influence of 
Rawls). 
 39Kant, Groundwork, pp. 46-47 (Ak. 4: 440). 
 40This last point does not mean that respect is conditional upon people in fact being 
morally conscientious. Autonomy is something we presuppose that others have, inde-
pendent of any specific knowledge of them. 
 41My argument in this paragraph also fits Henry Allison’s interpretation of Kant’s 
conception of autonomy, according to which “the defining characteristic of autonomy is 
not independence from causal determination by one’s needs as a sensuous being … It is 
rather a motivational independence, that is, a capacity for self-determination independently 
 Kantian Autonomy and Political Liberalism 351 
 
 
3. The Standpoint of Practical Reason 
 
A question posed by Jeremy Waldron is relevant for the discussion of 
whether Kant’s imperative to respect others as ends is internally related 
to what I have called “autonomy as self-origination.” Waldron asks: 
 
Why, on Kant’s account, is it important that my pursuit of happiness be determined by me 
rather than by another person or by the state? Certainly the latter would involve heterono-
my. But heteronomy is involved in the pursuit of happiness anyway, on Kant’s account.42  
 
Waldron wonders whether, when Kant argues that we ought to respect the 
right of others to pursue happiness, this means that the pursuit of happiness 
has its “own dimension of autonomy” different from moral autonomy. 
Waldron concludes that there are elements of this in Kant, but that they 
“do not add up to a theory of personal autonomy in the sense used by 
modern liberals.”43 
 I propose that we take a different approach from that suggested by 
Waldron, namely, that we highlight that respect and autonomy belong to 
the standpoint of practical reason and investigate more fully what that 
means. Waldron considers the influence of sociological facts on which 
conception of the good we choose and whether our reason is actually 
able to determine our ends.44 Thus, he takes the perspective of someone 
attempting to explain behavior and understands our acts as phenomena.45 
Or he oversteps the boundaries of reason and tries to provide a metaphys-
ical account of how reason can be practical.46 For me, the important Kan-
tian suggestion is that the autonomy we should respect does not belong to 
what there is, to what can be explained empirically or metaphysically, or 
to what can be known, but rather to the practical standpoint from which 
we ask what we should do and how to treat ourselves and others. From 
this standpoint and when we respect the humanity of others, we regard 
them “as active beings, as the authors of their thoughts and choices, as 
noumena.”47 
                                                                                                             
of, and even contrary to, these needs. Positively expressed, a will with the property of 
autonomy is one for which there are (or can be) reasons to act that are logically indepen-
dent of the agent’s needs as a sensuous being.” See Allison, Kant’s Theory of Freedom 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 97. 
 42Waldron, “Moral Autonomy and Personal Autonomy,” p. 309 (emphasis in original). 
 43Ibid., pp. 309, 314. See also the discussion of this issue in Taylor, “Kantian Per-
sonal Autonomy.” 
 44Waldron, “Moral Autonomy and Personal Autonomy,” pp. 309-10, 313-14. 
 45See Korsgaard, “Creating the Kingdom of Ends,” in Creating the Kingdom of Ends, 
pp. 188-221, at p. 204. 
 46Kant, Groundwork, p. 62 (Ak. 4: 458-59). 
 47Korsgaard writes: “When you respect the humanity of others you do not regard them 
as objects of knowledge—as phenomena—at all. Instead you regard them as active beings, 
as the authors of their thoughts and choices, as noumena.” Christine M. Korsgaard, “Intro-
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 In Kant, autonomy is a quality we unavoidably presuppose everyone 
has, not because we can explain it but because it is required “for practic-
al purposes … to make use of our reason in our conduct.”48 Thus, by the 
standpoint of practical reason, I mean the point of view we take when we 
regard ourselves as active beings who deliberate about what to do, who 
take responsibility for their actions, and who regard themselves as be-
longing to a community of agents who have equal rational capacities. 
Taking this standpoint does not move us into another plane of reality, but 
is in Kant’s words, “only a standpoint that reason sees itself constrained 
to take outside appearances in order to think itself as practical … as a 
rational cause active by means of reason, that is, operating freely.”49  
 The standpoint of practical reason is not defined only negatively, as 
freedom from inclinations and social influences. Autonomy seen from 
the standpoint of practical reason involves positive components in addi-
tion.50 For Kant it “would be an absurdity” to assume the free will to be 
merely negatively defined and thus lawless.51 When we deliberate about 
what to do—when reason sees itself as practical—we presuppose that we 
are able to give laws to ourselves, which, of course, is what autonomy 
literally means.52 For Kant, to give laws to oneself is the ability to act on 
the basis of rational principles or to be moved by reasons. And to be able 
to act on the basis of reason is to be able to give and respond to reasons 
that are intelligible and shareable with others, that is, public reasons.53 
Thus, the positive specification of autonomy involves both lawfulness 
and a community of beings with equal rational capacities, that is, the 
kingdom of ends.54 
                                                                                                             
duction,” in Creating the Kingdom of Ends, pp. ix-xv, at p. xi. See also Thomas Hill’s 
excellent account of Kantian autonomy in which he suggests “that we take it less as a 
metaphysical account of what we are like than a normative idea about the tasks, attitudes, 
and commitments of rational agents when deliberating about what to do.” Thomas E. 
Hill, Jr., “The Kantian Conception of Autonomy,” in Dignity and Practical Reason in 
Kant’s Moral Theory (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), pp. 76-96, at p. 84. 
 48Kant, Groundwork, p. 60 (Ak. 4: 455-56). 
 49Ibid., p. 62 (Ak. 4: 458). 
 50Cf. Hill, “Kant’s Theory of Practical Reason,” in Dignity and Practical Reason in 
Kant’s Moral Theory, pp. 123-46, at pp. 138 ff.; Andrews Reath, “Legislating for a 
Realm of Ends: The Social Dimension of Autonomy,” in Andrews Reath, Barbara Her-
man, and Christine M. Korsgaard (eds.) Reclaiming the History of Ethics: Essays for 
John Rawls (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 214-39, at pp. 216-17, 
224 ff. 
 51Kant, Groundwork, p. 52 (Ak. 4: 446); cf. The Metaphysics of Morals, in Practical 
Philosophy, pp. 380-81 (Ak. 6: 226-27). 
 52Kant, Groundwork, p. 47 (Ak. 4: 440). 
 53Onora O’Neill, “Enlightenment as Autonomy: Kant’s Vindication of Reason,” in 
Peter Hulme and Ludmilla Jordanova (eds.), The Enlightenment and Its Shadows (Lon-
don: Routledge, 1990), pp. 184-99, at pp. 195-96. 
 54Kant, Groundwork, p. 41 (Ak. 4: 433). 
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 The standpoint of practical reason, then, is one we share with other 
human beings. This is because reasons are intersubjective or shareable.55 
Not only moral reasons are shareable, but also reasons regarding the 
individual pursuit of happiness. This is not to say that our particular ends 
are shared, but that my rational pursuit of my ends can be made compre-
hensible to others.56 When deliberating, we necessarily see ourselves as 
belonging to or inhabiting a space that we share with others as reasoners. 
If others fail to recognize our reasons, they fail to treat us as sharing in 
the standpoint from which practical deliberation is possible. On this read-
ing, moreover, the Categorical Imperative—as distinguished from partic-
ular imperatives—is a requirement of acting from reasons shareable with 
others and, thus understood, a constraint to not preclude the possibility of 
everyone sharing the standpoint of practical reason from which the au-
tonomy of everyone is presupposed and respected.57 
 Because the standpoint of practical reason is one that we occupy with 
others, and because autonomy has a social dimension, our relations with 
other human beings and our relations with nature each have their differ-
ent implications for autonomy. We are dependent on other human beings, 
as co-reasoners and co-legislators, for regarding ourselves as autonom-
ous. But we share the world with other human beings not only from the 
standpoint of practical reason. We can treat others as phenomena as well, 
which we do when we regard them as objects of manipulation and coer-
cion rather than responsive to reasons. If this is right, we can reason with 
others about morality and conceptions of the good, but not force them to 
follow our conceptions without disrespecting their capacity for reasoning 
and acting on their own reasons, that is, without denying their capacity 
for autonomy. When we force others rather than engage their reason, we 
violate the rules that are constitutive of the standpoint of practical reason.  
 To return to Waldron’s question, the problem with others or the state 
determining my pursuit of happiness is that they would not treat me as a 
fellow inhabitant of the standpoint of practical reason.58 They would not 
treat me as someone who is moved by reasons, but as someone who is 
moved by sanctions. When another human being or the state interferes 
with my pursuit of happiness, they interfere with my reasoning process, 
they interfere with me in the standpoint from which I think, choose, and 
                                                 
 55Wood, Kantian Ethics, pp. 18-19; Christine M. Korsgaard, The Sources of Norma-
tivity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 131 ff. 
 56As Wood puts it, “if I have a valid, rational ground for what I do, then that ground 
is also comprehensible from the standpoint of others.” See Kantian Ethics, p. 18. 
 57Cf. Reath, “Legislating for a Realm of Ends,” pp. 222-23; O’Neill, “Enlightenment 
as Autonomy,” pp. 195 ff. 
 58“To respect others as ends in-in-themselves is to treat them as fellow inhabitants of 
the standpoint of practical reason.” Korsgaard, “Introduction,” in Creating the Kingdom 
of Ends, p. xi.  
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act, the standpoint I share with them as a fellow rational being, as rea-
soner and actor. The heteronomy involved in others determining my con-
ception of the good is one that affects the standpoint of practical reason-
ing that we share, and it is wrong because it bypasses relations of reason-
giving and justification. Conversely, the heteronomy involved in devis-
ing one’s conception of the good that comes from nature does not belong 
to, nor does it affect, the standpoint of practical reasoning: it does not 
concern the way in which rational agents stand in relation to each other, 
nor does it interfere with relations of reason-giving and justification. The 
heteronomy caused by the laws of nature (including sociological laws) 
belongs to and can only be explained from a different standpoint. 
 Moreover, if I am right that the humanity that is the object of respect 
includes the capacity for moral self-legislation, then part of the reason 
why it is important that I determine my own conception of happiness is 
that it includes respect for my capacity for giving myself ends that are 
compatible with universal self-legislation. If others determine my con-
ception of happiness on my behalf, they fail to respect that which Kant 
regards as making human beings worthy of happiness,59 namely, our 
capacity for acting according to and out of respect for the moral law 
while pursuing happiness. Interference with the pursuit of happiness of 
others is a denial of both humanity and personality. 
 “Kantian autonomy” is usually seen as identical to moral autonomy. 
On the basis of the discussion above, however, it could also be seen as 
referring to the autonomy we presuppose and respect when acting and 
thinking as opposed to autonomy understood descriptively, theoretically, 
or metaphysically, and as something to be promoted. The most valuable 
aspect of the Kantian conception of autonomy is exactly that it is a prac-
tical—not metaphysical—idea, and first and foremost a capacity that 
must be respected rather than a good to be promoted. In Kant, we find a 
requirement of respecting others as both personally autonomous (as able 
to set particular ends for themselves) and morally autonomous (as capa-
ble of giving themselves and subjecting themselves to the moral law). To 
be sure, Kant does not call the pursuit of happiness “autonomy”; never-
theless, it is part of the capacity that his conception of treating others as 
ends refers to. 
 I have argued that we should approach autonomy from the standpoint 
of practical reason and that this means that autonomy is a capacity to be 
respected in everyone rather than a good to be promoted. Autonomy so 
conceived constitutes the practical point of view: we cannot deny it with-
out undermining the possibility of seeing ourselves and others as moral 
beings worthy of respect. It should be noted that this approach provides 
                                                 
 59Cf. Kant, Groundwork, p. 7 (Ak. 4: 393). 
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what we may call normative priority to respecting the autonomy of oth-
ers over promoting autonomy as a good rather than discarding the latter 
idea entirely. The standpoint of practical reason is a perspective we can 
and should take upon ourselves and others, but we can also—and some-
times should—change perspective and look at ourselves and others as 
phenomena. Taking the latter perspective, we learn that autonomy is also 
something that can be promoted; everyone can become more rational, self-
reflective, and moral. However, the understanding of autonomy we attain 
from the practical standpoint—the Kantian notion that everyone must be 
presumed to have autonomy—imposes an absolute limit on how we can 
treat others, and thereby constrains how we can treat others when we re-
gard them as objects of knowledge, as empirical beings whose autonomy 
can be promoted.60 This absolute limit is the principle of equal respect. 
 How does this relate to the attack on Kantian autonomy by political 
liberals? My worry is that their attack on autonomy is too wide-ranging. 
It is a correct move in the face of the fact of reasonable pluralism not to 
ground liberalism in a sectarian idea of the autonomous life as the only 
good life. This, however, should not lead us to reject the Kantian idea of 
respecting others as autonomous persons. We need the latter idea in order 
to understand what respect means and requires, and as grounds for reject-
ing the sectarian and perfectionist idea of autonomy as something that 
should be promoted as good in itself.61 There is a difference between 
rejecting autonomy as a good and rejecting Kantian autonomy, namely, 
as Rainer Forst puts it,  
 
that the first rejection can (and should) be based on the latter notion of autonomy, arguing 
against an unjustifiable imposition of a notion of the good, whereas the rejection of moral 
[Kantian] autonomy is either reciprocally unjustifiable, for one denies to others what one 
claims for oneself, i.e., to be respected as a person whose reasons and claims are taken 
seriously, or it is self-contradictory, for one would argue (with reasons) that one does not 
want to be respected as someone whose reasons and claims need to be respected.62 
 
 Note that Forst’s point relies on the participant perspective, that is, 
how participants make claims on each other. From this perspective, one 
cannot avoid presupposing a conception of autonomy; whether this con-
                                                 
 60“Kant typically treats autonomy as an all-or-nothing trait that grounds a basic re-
spect due to all human beings, as opposed to a variable respect earned only by the most 
conscientious.” Hill, “The Kantian Conception of Autonomy,” p. 79; see also Thomas E. 
Hill, Jr., “Must Respect be Earned?” in Respect, Pluralism, and Justice (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 87-118, at pp. 91-92, 108. 
 61Note that I reject only promoting autonomy as a good for everyone, not promoting 
autonomy when it has instrumental value for respecting everyone as equal. 
 62Rainer Forst, “A Critical Theory of Multicultural Toleration,” in Anthony Simon 
Laden and David Owen (eds.), Multiculturalism and Political Theory (New York: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2007), pp. 292-311, at p. 302. 
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ception of autonomy need be the strong Kantian idea of self-originating 
lawfulness or can be a less demanding conception of autonomy, I consider 
further below. What I have attempted to do above is to show that respect 
and treating others as ends in Kantian ethics is not so one-sidedly bound up 
with the idea of autonomy as self-origination and moral autonomy as many 
think and as political liberals would find excessively controversial. 
 Moreover, even though the Kantian conception of respect also relates 
to the idea of personal autonomy, it does not do so in a way that posits an 
autonomous life as one everyone should pursue and which the state 
ought to promote because it is good in itself. Nor do Kantians make re-
spect conditional upon people actually leading autonomous lives.63 To 
see autonomy as foundational in the sense that it is a good that ought to 
be promoted and maximized is an entirely different idea from the Kan-
tian view that we ought to treat others as if morally and personally auto-
nomous.64 Indeed, the principle of respect and in general the preoccupa-
tion with reasonable disagreement characterizing political liberalism 
presuppose the idea that people should be treated as capable of reflective-
ly choosing their own ends and doing so with respect for the moral law. 
When we reject the idea that one conception of the good should be al-
lowed to dominate, it is because we hold everyone capable of and en-
titled to form their own morally permissible conceptions of the good. 
 Talk of rational determination of ends and shareable reasons might 
lead to the objection that Kantian autonomy involves an untenable re-
quirement that people publicly justify their particular ends to each other. 
This would be a violation of the liberal right to individually and privately 
determine one’s own conception of the good. To respond to this impor-
tant objection we need to emphasize two points. First, the idea that rea-
sons are intersubjective and shared does not mean that my choice and 
action can be called rational only if others share my reasons. The point is 
that reasons are shareable, and thus my choice or action is rational only 
if others can comprehend my reasons. Second, the rationality of end-
setting that matters for equal respect does not refer to the rationality of 
the content of my conception of the good (say, that I can give shareable 
reasons for my belief or nonbelief in God), but rather to the rationality of 
setting this particular end in relation to others’ ends. In other words, the 
ability of rational end-setting that we should respect in others refers to 
their ability to rationally set ends that fit into the kingdom of ends, that 
is, ends that are compatible with the status of everyone else as ends in 
themselves. 
                                                 
 63See Hill, “Must Respect be Earned?” 
 64This might be seen as the difference between a Millian and a Kantian conception of 
autonomy; cf. Rostbøll, “Autonomy, Respect, and Arrogance in the Danish Cartoon 
Controversy,” and “From the Standpoint of Practical Reason.” 
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4. Practical Constructivism 
 
Until now my focus has been on autonomous end-setting and respect for 
diverse conceptions of the good. We should, however, consider also what 
Rawls calls “constitutive autonomy,” that is, the notion “that the order of 
moral and political values must be made, or itself constituted, by the prin-
ciples and conceptions of practical reason.”65 Rawls contrasts this view—
Kantian or moral constructivism—with moral intuitionism, which sees the 
order of values as independent of human will and as self-constituted. Polit-
ical liberals reject constitutive autonomy and Kantian constructivism, but 
Rawls and Larmore do so for different reasons. Rawls does not reject Kan-
tian constructivism as a moral theory, but only as a political theory—
because it is metaphysical and not political. Larmore, by contrast, rejects 
the antirealism of Kantian constructivism as a wrong-headed account of 
reason and morality. Larmore is a moral realist; he believes that there are 
moral principles that have validity independent of human will and that 
reason “is at bottom a receptive, not a self-legislating faculty.”66 
 In line with my argument about the standpoint of practical reason, I 
propose that we understand constructivism practically rather than meta-
physically. This has advantages in relation to both reasonable pluralism 
and democratic self-legislation. To approach this issue I shall discuss 
Larmore’s position again, because I think a critical engagement with it 
shows some shortcomings of rejecting constructivism and self-legislation. 
Larmore’s most sustained criticism of autonomy is the one directed at the 
Kantian idea that what gives the moral law authority is that it is self-
legislated as well as its political variant: that there is no validity indepen-
dent of the collective will of citizens. 
 Even though Larmore says that his understanding of the meaning of 
reason and morality need not become part of “our self-understanding as 
liberal citizens,”67 the idea of independent validity is also central to his 
political theory. Thus, after reaffirming his commitment to political lib-
eralism, he writes:  
 
Still, I also believe that we as citizens do well to see that our political life is founded on a 
principle, the principle of equal respect, whose authority does not derive from our collective 
will … my critique of the modern idea of being subject only to principles we institute our-
selves points to a sense of being bound from without that we ought to share as citizens.”68  
 
Larmore again gives a very strong reading to the idea of self-legislation 
in both Kant and in contemporary Kantian constructivism. He appears to 
                                                 
 65Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 99. 
 66Larmore, The Autonomy of Morality, p. 45. 
 67Ibid., p. 14. 
 68Ibid.; cf. p. 150. 
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give it a metaphysical reading, as claiming that we actually construct or 
make norms and that this is what gives them authority.69 
 Both a realist view, according to which norms have independent va-
lidity and are actually discovered, and a metaphysically constructivist 
view, according to which norms are made, are views about which rea-
sonable disagreement exists. Fortunately, what we need agreement on for 
practical purposes and in politics is not the metaphysical question, but 
rather how norms are justified, that is, which procedure to follow to justi-
fy norms to each other and to make political principles “as transparent to 
one’s own reason as to that of others.”70 One might think that Larmore, 
as a political liberal, would agree. As noted, however, he thinks that citi-
zens would do well to acknowledge that the principle of respect has a 
validity that is independent of their own will and thus to accept a source 
of normativity prior to any procedure—and to democratic deliberation 
and justification. 
 My suggestion is that from the practical standpoint, we can—and that 
political theory should—be agnostic as to whether reason is receptive or 
self-legislating as long as we agree to regard the authority of collectively 
binding norms as arising from common deliberative procedures of justi-
fication in which everyone is regarded and respected as self-legislating. 
Hence, we should avoid understanding constructivism metaphysically, 
that is, as holding that norms are really made rather than discovered, but 
rather see constructivism practically.71 Practical constructivism leaves 
aside the metaphysical question of the ultimate source of reasons and 
values and focuses on justification procedures and the standing of citizens. 
 The respect we show each other, then, is shown in the practice of 
                                                 
 69Here, we should note an important disagreement among contemporary Kantians. 
Korsgaard, for example, draws a sharp distinction between practical and theoretical rea-
soning, and argues that what we presuppose in practical deliberation has no relation to 
metaphysical entities. Wood agrees that humanity as an end in itself is a presupposition 
of rational volition, but insists that end-setting is merely an exercise of practical reason if 
good reason already exists to set that end, and that the absolute worth of humanity is not 
something human beings can confer but something that already belongs to them essential-
ly (Wood, Kantian Ethics, pp. 90 ff., 112). In this way, Wood’s Kantian position comes 
close to Larmore’s moral realism and Larmore’s argument that reason is a receptive 
faculty. Wood, however, also writes: “We regard moral laws, which proceed from no 
will but lie in the nature of the will or practical reason, as if the will of every rational 
being were their author and legislator. We are justified in considering them this way 
because that way of thinking about them brings together the formal conception of univer-
sal law with the material conception of the absolute value of humanity or rational nature.” 
Wood, Kantian Ethics, pp. 116-17. 
 70Larmore, The Autonomy of Morality, p. 163. 
 71Cf. Rainer Forst, “Moralische Autonomie und Autonomie der Moral. Zu einer 
Theorie der Normativität nach Kant,” in his Das Recht auf Rechtfertigung. Elemente 
einer Theorie der Gerechtigkeit (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2007), pp. 74-99, at pp. 83-84. 
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moral-political deliberation and not in the knowledge of some theoretical 
or metaphysical truth. We treat others as ends when we act towards them 
as if they were autonomous, not in the absolute knowledge of the ulti-
mate source of reasons and norms. The crucial Kantian insight is that 
autonomy is something we presuppose when deliberating about what to 
do, something we cannot deny without self-contradiction; more than this 
we do not need in political theory. What matters from the standpoint of 
practical reason and for morality as a relation is that we regard basic 
moral and political principles as necessary conditions of and products of 
our common moral and deliberative practices. The principle of respect 
belongs to this same practical perspective, and its basis is that we regard 
each other as self-legislating.  
 Basing liberalism on the principles of respect and autonomy that are 
constitutive of the standpoint of practical reason differs from Rawls’s 
political liberalism, the content of which “is expressed in terms of certain 
fundamental ideas seen as implicit in the public political culture of a 
democratic society.”72 Rawls’s position has the advantage of drawing on 
principles that are already accepted, but because it relies on contingent 
material from a specific culture, it can be criticized for leaning “towards 
a semi-relativist direction.”73 Here I agree with Larmore that political 
liberalism cannot be freestanding but needs a moral basis. This moral 
basis, however, need not be (grounded in) an independent order of val-
ues, but can be seen as expressed in that which constitutes the standpoint 
of practical reason, that is, the commitments and attitudes of rational 
agents deliberating about what to do. When we see this, we in addition 
see that the principle of respect cannot be divorced from the commitment 
to autonomy. 
 
 
5. Democratic Self-Legislation vs. Self-Government 
 
The suggestion that we can dispense of the strong or metaphysical notion 
of constitutive autonomy means that we can understand autonomy less 
controversially. It does not, however, reduce autonomy to self-government, 
since it holds on to the idea that from a practical point of view, we regard 
ourselves and each other as the source of common binding principles. 
Self-government refers to the ability to attain moral knowledge and bring 
our actions into conformity with an order of values independent of us; 
Kantian autonomy entails the stronger notion that the order of values we 
                                                 
 72Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 13. 
 73Miriam Ronzoni, “Constructivism and Practical Reason: On Intersubjectivity, Ab-
straction, and Judgment,” Journal of Moral Philosophy 7 (2010): 74-104, p. 84. 
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ought to act in conformity with is self-imposed and self-legislated.74 It is 
part of my argument that when applying this distinction in political 
theory, we should hold on to the stronger Kantian notion of self-
legislation (still understood practically), because the weaker idea of self-
government brings into focus only citizens’ roles as subjects of law, and 
thereby tends toward displacing democratic politics. 
 The distinction between self-government and self-legislation is evi-
dent in two different versions of the relationship between legitimate state 
authority and autonomy among neo-Kantian political theorists. The first 
version we find, for example, in T.M. Scanlon’s “A Theory of Freedom 
of Expression.”75 According to Scanlon, “the powers of the state are li-
mited to those that citizens could recognize while still regarding them-
selves as equal, autonomous, rational agents.”76 Here, autonomy refers to 
citizens’ self-understanding as individually autonomous beings as op-
posed to their collective exercise of autonomy. This way of invoking 
autonomy rules out justifications for restricting freedom that disrespect 
the individual’s ability to determine on their own what to believe and do 
as subject to law; that is, it grounds citizens’ negative freedom against 
state interference. The second version we find, for example, in Jürgen 
Habermas, who refers to the “dogmatic core” of his discourse theory of 
democracy as “the idea of autonomy according to which human beings 
acts as free subjects only insofar as they obey just those laws they give 
themselves in accordance with insights they have acquired intersubjec-
tively.”77 In this view, it is fundamental not merely to respect citizens’ 
moral personality as autonomous beings as subject to law, but to respect 
them as capable of being the actual authors of the laws to which they are 
subject as addressees.  
 The difference between the two views could also be characterized as 
one between the content of the justification of laws (whether it respects 
citizens’ self-understanding as autonomous) and the justification proce-
dure that brought about the laws (whether it allows citizens to see them-
selves as the actual authors of the laws). It seems to me that political 
liberalism must share the first view while rejecting the latter, procedural-
ist view. Larmore’s insistence that political principles must be justifiable 
to all and equally transparent to everyone’s reason presupposes a com-
                                                 
 74J.B. Schneewind, The Invention of Autonomy: A History of Modern Moral Philoso-
phy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 513-15. 
 75T.M. Scanlon, “A Theory of Freedom of Expression,” in The Difficulty of Toler-
ance: Essays in Political Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 
pp. 6-25. 
 76Scanlon, “A Theory of Freedom of Expression,” p. 15. 
 77Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory 
of Law and Democracy, trans. William Rehg (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), pp. 445-
46. 
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mitment to an understanding of autonomy as the capacity to know and do 
what is right, as Scanlon’s theory does. Larmore also invokes the distinc-
tion between self-government and self-legislation, saying that we should 
hold on to the first idea but that there is “no reason … to hope for more,” 
that is, for self-legislation.78 
 I propose that there is reason to hope for being self-legislating rather 
than merely self-governing. From the standpoint of practical reason that I 
have emphasized, regarding political principles as self-legislated says 
something not about their metaphysical source but about the relations in 
which citizens stand to each other. When citizens regard the principles 
that are binding on them as the product of self-legislation, then they give 
each other a certain standing; they respect each other as co-authors of 
common principles. Most importantly, they acknowledge that there is no 
political, legitimate source of common principles other than their com-
mon deliberations. The idea of self-government does not confer the same 
status on citizens, because even if it regards them as capable of respond-
ing to reasons, it does not regard them as the sole source of reasons. Self-
government focuses on the status we have as subject to law, whereas 
self-legislation also includes our status as authors of law. The distinction 
points to the important difference between having reason to endorse 
something and actually having been a participant in giving and evaluat-
ing reasons.79 
 While Larmore accepts that constitutional principles should be seen 
as legitimate “in virtue of being objects of reasonable agreement, and 
thus their authority is taken to derive from our collective will as citi-
zens,” he insists that the principle of respect must be understood as hav-
ing “a deeper kind of validity”; it “must be considered as a norm binding 
on us independent of our will as citizens, enjoying a moral authority that 
we have not fashioned ourselves.”80 The principle of respect for persons 
“enjoys a validity independent of its being the object of the democratic 
will. For it defines precisely what shall count as an authoritative expres-
sion of the will of the people.”81 
 Naturally, it is correct that no neo-Kantian would regard any empiri-
cally reached consensus as constitutive of justice or legitimacy. In this 
manner, it is also right to say that political liberalism must have a moral 
basis. What I reject is that this moral basis should have a “validity that 
must be understood as antecedent to the democratic will,”82 and that it 
                                                 
 78Larmore, The Autonomy of Morality, p. 46. 
 79Christian F. Rostbøll, Deliberative Freedom: Deliberative Democracy as Critical 
Theory (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2008), p. 73. 
 80Larmore, The Autonomy of Morality, p. 150. 
 81Larmore, “Respect for Persons,” p. 74.  
 82Larmore, The Autonomy of Morality, p. 140. 
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lies in the principle of equal respect as opposed to or independently of a 
principle of autonomy. Larmore’s discussion is directed at both Kantian 
constructivism and Habermas’s discourse theory of democracy. In these 
theories, however, not everything is constructed, and we should distin-
guish between the norms that are constructed and the justification proce-
dure in which these norms are agreed to, noting that the justification pro-
cedure itself is not constructed but reconstructed.83 Reconstruction nei-
ther builds upon the norms people have fashioned for themselves as the 
substantive outcomes of their normative practices, nor does it introduce a 
norm from outside these practices that it imposes on them. Rather, it 
builds on norms that are constitutive of practical reasoning and delibera-
tion, norms that thinking and acting beings must be committed to in or-
der to regard themselves and others as such. For Kantian constructivists, 
some norms are internal to and constitutive of processes of self-
legislation and therefore cannot be seen as based on an antecedent order 
of values, nor can they be regarded as imposed and constraining.84 
 In contrast to the Kantian notion of the standpoint of practical reason, 
Larmore takes a theoretical approach and therefore cannot see respect for 
persons as a procedural norm and as internal to our democratic practices. 
Larmore imposes the norms—or at least the norm of equal respect—from 
outside human practices.85 In this manner, he may seem to steer free of 
the controversial ideal of autonomy, but he does so at the cost of replac-
ing democratic politics with theoretical solutions. When the validity of a 
norm is brought in from outside moral-political practices as having a 
validity that is independent of processes of claim-making and reason-
giving, then it is disconnected from them and will also ignore that and 
how procedural norms are recursively justified and reinterpreted in these 
practices.86 If we do not go beyond self-government to self-legislation, 
human beings and their common deliberative practices lack the dignity of 
                                                 
 83Forst, “Moralische Autonomie und Autonomie der Moral,” p. 80. 
 84See John Rawls, Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 2000), p. 230; Korsgaard, Sources of Normativity, pp. 234-36. 
 85Sometimes Larmore comes close to seeing respect for persons as a procedural norm 
(e.g., The Autonomy of Morality, pp. 162-63), but this contradicts the idea of seeing it as 
an individual right and as having validity independent of human activity. 
 86For what is involved in the recursive reinterpretation and revision of the procedure 
itself, see Christian F. Rostbøll, “The Use and Abuse of ‘Universal Values’ in the Danish 
Cartoon Controversy,” European Political Science Review 2 (2010): 401-22. Cf. also 
what Seyla Benhabib refers to as democratic iterations and jurisgenerative politics: “itera-
tive acts through which a democratic people that considers itself bound by certain guiding 
norms and principles reappropriates and reinterprets these, thus showing itself to be not 
only the subject but also the author of laws.” See The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents, 
and Citizens (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 181 (emphasis in origi-
nal). See also Rainer Forst, “Einleitung: Der Grund der Gerechtigkeit,” in Das Recht auf 
Rechtfertigung, pp. 9-20, at p. 16. 
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being the ultimate source of normativity. The principle of respect there-
fore loses its ground and meaning.87 
 The advantage of the Kantian conception of autonomy as self-
legislation is that it establishes a connection between the source and the 
content of normativity. Our dignity as autonomous beings is confirmed 
both in regarding autonomy as the source of our obligations and in the 
content of a morality the core content of which is to respect everyone as 
autonomous beings. Another way of putting this point is to say that the 
Kantian moral framework requires the construction of moral norms under 
conditions in which everyone is regarded as co-legislators and that the 
substantive norms agreed to must respect everyone as having ends of 
their own and as equal subjects and legislators of universal laws. The 
political and democratic version of this Kantian idea establishes the in-
ternal connection between democratic practices of self-legislation and the 
norms of respect for autonomy that they presuppose. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
I have proposed that, rightly understood, autonomy is not only compati-
ble with but presupposed by the principle of equal respect. Autonomy is 
compatible with respect for people’s capacity to hold diverse conceptions 
of the good when its value is seen as instrumental rather than noninstru-
mental and when the fundamental commitment is to respecting autonomy 
as a norm regulating interpersonal relations rather than to promoting it as 
a good. The approach we should take to arrive at the proper conception 
of autonomy is a practical rather than a theoretical approach. When we 
see autonomy from the standpoint of practical reason, we see it as an 
idea and a principle that deliberating and acting people necessarily must 
be committed to when deciding what to do in common. In the practical 
approach, autonomy is a norm regulating how we treat each other as 
opposed to a good to be promoted.  
 How does this bear on the place of autonomy in liberalism? The con-
tention of this article is that it is self-defeating for a theory that posits 
respect for persons as the moral basis of liberalism to reject any and all 
notions of autonomy. Liberal political theory cannot discard the notion of 
autonomy entirely without also jeopardizing other core liberal principles 
                                                 
 87It might be objected that the idea of human beings being the ultimate source of 
political normativity is incompatible with reasonable pluralism, since many people would 
reject this notion if asked in an opinion poll (a suggestion made by an anonymous refe-
ree). However, the issue is less what people would accept than what they ought to accept 
given certain other commitments that they have or ought to have. My argument is limited 
to the contention that if we accept the principle of equal respect, then we cannot discard 
Kantian autonomy. 
364 Christian F. Rostbøll 
 
 
  
and without undermining its own source of normativity. My aim has 
been to show that it is premature to discard the Kantian conception of 
autonomy and that its status as a practical idea must be further explored. 
We can separate the principle of respect for persons from the metaphysi-
cal idea of autonomy as self-origination of binding principles but not 
from autonomy as a necessary commitment in our moral-political delib-
erations. Respect for persons and the authority of moral-political claims 
are internally related to the mutual affirmation of our autonomy as equal 
subjects and authors of binding principles. 
 If liberals discard Kantian autonomy, understood from the standpoint 
of practical reason, they also abandon an important insight into the con-
nection between liberalism and democracy. Politically and institutional-
ly, the attempt to disconnect respect from autonomy leads to giving 
priority to individual rights over democratic self-rule.88 Such a priority 
gives meaning, however, only from a grounding of respect in an order of 
values independent from our deliberative practices. But, as I have argued, 
this grounding devalues our practices and thus cannot undergird respect 
for everyone’s capacity for participating in democratic self-legislation. 
For the latter we need the Kantian conception of autonomy.89 
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 88This, again, is explicit in Larmore, who (in a discussion of Habermas) rejects the 
idea that popular sovereignty and individual rights can be co-original, because “an idea of 
individual rights precedes and defines the exercise of self-rule.” Larmore, The Autonomy 
of Morality, p. 159. For Habermas’s argument about the co-originality of individual 
rights and popular sovereignty, see Between Facts and Norms, chap. 3. 
 89Earlier versions of this article were presented at the Joint Sessions of Workshops of 
the European Consortium for Political Research, Workshop 6: Political Normativity: 
Conceptual and Normative Issues, Lisbon, Portugal, April 14-19, 2009; and at the Annual 
Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Toronto, Canada, September 3-6, 
2009. For comments, I would like to thank the participants on these occasions, particular-
ly Rainer Forst and Peter Niesen, as well as Pablo Gilabert and Reidar Maliks. 
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